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Women and the Law in Thailand and Canada 
Law can be both an obstacle to, and an instrument of social 
transformation. The problem concerning women and the law has 
been considered to center around three key issues. Firstly, laws 
are often unjust or discriminatory, limiting the rights of women. 
Secondly, the application of law is often arbitrary or 
prejudicial toward women, and thirdly, women tend to be unaware 
of their own legal status, of the rights they do possess, of the 
effect laws have on them, or even that they are the objects of 
injustice.) 
Therefore, one of the important objectives of women 
activists is to struggle against legal inequity. In many ways 
Canadian laws provide a good example of a certain degree of 
achievement in this pursuit. And though there are still 
shortcomings in many legal provisions which do not satisfy 
feminist groups, Canadian women enjoy much better treatment under 
the law than Thai women. 
This paper presents an attempt to conduct a general survey 
of Canadian laws in areas relating to women, which are also the 
subjects of current debates for law reforms in Thailand. It does 
not purport to present an in-depth discussion of Canadian law, an 
endeavour which the writer's expertise does not permit and which 
has been done abundantly by Canadian lawyers and academics. 
1. Historical Subordination of Canadian and Thai women 
Historically, both Canadian and Thai women shared the same 
fate in their subordinate position to men. According to the 
Husband and Wife Law dated from 1361 to 1935, Thai women were 
regarded as pieces of property. She could be sold by her father 
and if married, by her husband. A husband had a right to beat 
1 Margaret Schuler: Empowerment & the Law, OFF 
International, 1986, p. 6. 
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his wife for correction. He was entitled to have as many wives 
as he wished while a wife was expected to be loyal to only one 
husband with cruel punishment or death penalty in case of 
adultery. On separation, a husband was entitled to a bigger 
share in the division of matrimonial property. While a husband 
would always receive a share in the division of property no 
matter whether he had come to the marriage empty-handed or not, a 
wife could only get one third of the property if she had come to 
the marriage with a certain amount of real or personal property. 
If she had come empty-handed, she had to leave in the same 
manner. 
In 1935, the enactment of the Civil and Commercial Code, 
Book V (which dealt with family law) improved the position of 
Thai women tremendously. For the first time, it prescribed the 
concept of "one man, one wife". Women were regarded as a 
persons, not as pieces of property. However, the legislation 
maintained a large number of discriminatory provisions. For 
instance, according to the law, a husband was the head of the 
conjugal union; he chose the place of residence and directed what 
was to be done for maintenance and support. He had the authority 
to hold the rights of his wife, ranging from choice of 
occupation, management of matrimonial property and childbearing. 
Adultery as a ground for divorce was available to a husband only. 
Some of the injustices have been remedied by the Revised Book V 
of the Civil and Commercial Code which was proclaimed in October 
1976. This is the law governing the status of women in family 
law at present. However, as will be seen later, the legislation 
still contains a few discriminatory provisions. 
In Canada, about one hundred years preceding the enactment 
of the Charter, the rights of Canadian women were seriously 
circumscribed in and by the law. She was not able to vote, hold 
elected office, serve as a police constable, sit on a jury or 
participate in the professions. Her employment opportunities 
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were limited to areas of domestic work, cooking, child care, 
basic instruction and light manufacturing. Her wages were low 
and if she were married, her husband had the right to her wages 
even if they had separated. Upon marriage, she assumed her 
husband's nationality and domicile. A married women could not 
make a will or make binding contracts. Her real and personal 
property were under almost complete control of her husband. In 
common law, the husband had the right to determine the religion 
and education of the children, and he was also thought to have 
the right to administer "moderate correction" to a disobedient 
wife. 
Successive waves of law reform in Canada have brought about 
many changes granting women the right to vote, to hold public 
office, to participate in the professions, to hold, use, and 
enjoy property on the same basis as men and to equal custody and 
guardianship of their children. The famous "Persons" Case was 
the climax of this development. This is the case in which the 
Privy Council, in revising the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in interpreting the word "persons" in section 24 of the 
British North America Act, held that women, being "qualified 
persons" within the meaning of the section, could be appointed to 
the Senate.2 
2. Women and the Constitution 
It has long been recognized that a constitutional guarantee 
of equal rights between men and women is a necessity and the 
first step towards equality in law. This has already been 
achieved in many countries. In Canada, the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms expressly prohibits sex-based discrimination. The two 
sections that directly relate to this issue are sections 15 and 
28 which provide as follows: 
2 Edwards v. A.G. Canada (1930) A.C. 124 (P.C.) 
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Section 15 
(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and 
has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the 
law without discrimination and, in particular, without 
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, 
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or 
activity that has as its object the amelioration of 
conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including 
those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or 
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability. 
Section 28 
Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and 
freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and 
female persons. 
Both sections are to be read in the context of Section 1 of 
the Charter which provides that: 
Section 1 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the 
rights and freedoms set out in it, subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society. 
An overall picture now is that formal legal equality has 
been achieved in Canada. Subsection 15(1) provides, in effect, 
four separate guarantees of equality, namely, equal before the 
law, equal under the law, equal benefit and equal protection of 
the law. However the achievement of formal legal equality can be 
characterized as only a first step. While it is an essential 
prerequisite to enhance the legal and social position of women, 
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it is only part of what is needed to reverse the effects of past 
subordination. It has been recognized that it is not sufficient 
that women should be treated the same as men. Special laws and 
special programs are needed to remedy the effect of centuries of 
discrimination. Thus subsection 15(2) of the Charter 
specifically renders affirmative action programs legal. This 
section gives constitutional credence to the concept that in 
order to get beyond discrimination, we sometimes have to take 
into account the fact that discrimination exists and in order to 
ensure equality, we have to treat some persons differently. The 
question of what kinds of strategies are needed has not been 
resolved and it is too early to assess the impact of this 
section. We shall return to this later when we discuss the 
problems concerning other legislation related to women. 
Apart from the constitutional guarantees embodied in the 
Charter, Canada also has other legislation which expressly 
prohibits sex discrimination. Before the Charter, the Canadian 
Bill of Rights which came into force in 1960, had already 
provided the guarantees. Section 1 of the Canadian Bill of 
Rights provides that "it is hereby recognized and declared that 
in Canada there have existed and shall continue to exist without 
discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, 
religion or sex, the following human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, namely ...". The Act then enumerates various 
fundamental rights and freedoms such as right of the individual 
to life, liberty, security of the person, equality before the law 
and the protection of the law.3 
In addition to the Canadian Bill of Rights, the Canadian 
Human Rights Act which came into force in 1977 provides that 
"race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, 
3 Section 1 of the Canadian Bill of Rights. 
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marital status, family status, disability and conviction for 
which a pardon has been granted are prohibited grounds of 
discrimination. The Act lists various practices which are 
regarded as discriminatory, such as to differentiate adversely in 
employment and in the provision of goods, services, facilities or 
accommodation.4 How effective is this kind of legislation in 
dealing with the problem of discrimination and in promoting 
equality is a question which we shall return to later. 
For the moment it is fair to say that Canada is not lacking 
legislation prohibiting sex discrimination. The big remaining 
problem seems to be what further steps should be taken in terms 
of legislation to be enacted and reforms to existing legislation 
in order to achieve equality in fact (and not simply formal legal 
equality under the law) between men and women. 
Nothing of this can be said about Thailand. There is not 
even a single clause in the Constitution which guarantees 
equality between men and women or prohibits sex discrimination. 
Since 1932 when the regime of absolute monarchy was replaced by a 
system of constitutional monarchy and democratic government, 
thirteen constitutions have been proclaimed. The present 
Constitution was promulgated in December 1978. All previous 
Constitutions were all abrogated either as a result of a military 
coup or political turmoil. Unlike the Canadian Constitution, the 
Thai Constitution is embodied in a single document comprising 206 
articles. Of all the Constitutions, the 1974 Constitution was 
the only one which provided specifically that "men and women have 
equal rights".5 The reason for this is understandable. The 
Constitution was the product of the widespread demonstrations by 
4 See Sections 5-13 of the Canadian Human 
Rights Act. 
5 Section 28 of the 1974 Constitution of 
Thailand. 
7 
students in October 1973 to overthrow the military regime then in 
power. After the military leaders fled the country, the King 
appointed a civilian Government and the 1974 Constitution was 
proclaimed in the following year. This Constitution has been 
regarded as the most liberal in Thai political history. 
Unfortunately it was in force for only two years and was 
abolished as a result of a bloody coup in October 1976. 
Successive Constitutions, by far less liberal in a number of 
ways, have never recognized women's rights. 
Instead, the present Constitution states simply that "all 
persons are equal before the law and shall enjoy equal protection 
under the lawi6 with no specific mention of any disadvantaged 
groups including women. For Thai women therefore, any 
constitutional guarantee for equal rights between the sexes is a 
thing of the past. There is no prospect in the near future that 
any government will give attention to this issue and amend the 
Constitution in order to accommodate equality rights for women. 
This is likely to be the situation for many years to come. In 
contrast to Canada, Thai Constitutional law has failed even to 
achieve a minimum standard of formal legal equality between men 
and women. 
The absence of an equal protection clause for women leaves 
Thai women with no legal basis to challenge discriminatory 
practices especially in education and employment. It is 
legitimate for employers to put in an advertisement inviting job 
applications which specifies "being male" as a condition. 
Certain government regulations prohibit women applying for 
certain jobs such as a district officer, forestry officer, 
district accountants and so on. Some laws discriminate against 
women explicitly. For instance, according to the law concerning 
nationality, a Thai woman marrying an alien cannot confer Thai 
6 Section 23 of the 1978 Constitution 
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nationality upon her child. This applies no matter whether the 
child is born in or outside the country 7. On the contrary, a 
Thai man marrying an alien can confer Thai nationality on his 
child regardless of where the child is born. 
The short-lived 1974 Constitution which contained an equal 
protection clause for men and women did bring about some 
improvement in the status of women. During the two-year period 
that the Constitution was in force, the family law was revised 
with an objective to equalize the spouses' position. Also, a 
government regulation prohibiting women to enter the judicial 
profession was amended. As a result, there are now about 30 
women judges throughout the country. After the abrogation of the 
1974 Constitution, there has been hardly any major change in the 
law relating to women. The only significant development was in 
1982 when an amendment was made to the local Administration Act. 
This allows women to become village or district headmen. 
According to 1987 statistics, 228 women village headmen and 16 
women district headmen have been elected. 
Except for these changes in the law, equality rights have 
hardly been an issue in law reforms. Given Thai women's 
traditional subordinate role which already makes it difficult to 
compete with men in all areas, this lack of protection under the 
law means that Thai women are still a long way from equality. 
3. Women and Criminal Law 
In this section I will consider particular areas of criminal 
law which directly affect women and which are the subjects of 
debate for law reform in Thailand. This will cover laws 
concerning sexual offences, prostitution, abortion and domestic 
violence. 
7 See Section 7 of the Nationality Act 1965 and the 
Revolutionary Council Order No. 337, 1972. 
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3.1 Sexual Offences 
By the term "sexual offences", I refer to sexual offences 
against vulnerable people and sexual assault offences. It should 
be noted that under Canadian Criminal law, sexual assault 
offences are placed along with all other assault offences in Part 
Vl of the Criminal Code which concerns offences against the 
person and reputation, instead of in Part 1V which concerns 
sexual offences, public morals and disorderly conduct. This 
stems from the principle that sexual assault is primarily an act 
of violence, of domination and humiliation of the victim by the 
aggressor, therefore, it should be based upon the inviolability 
of the person rather than a particular concept of morality. 
According to the Penal Code of Thailand, all sexual assault 
offences are still classified in the same group as other sexual 
offences. 
In substance, there is no significant difference between 
Canadian and Thai law with regard to sexual offences against 
vulnerable people. For instance, in Canada it is an offence to 
have sexual intercourse with a female under the age of fourteen.8 
A similar offence appears in the Thai Penal Code and this applies 
if the female is under the age of fifteen.9 While the Thai Penal 
Code provides specifically for an offence of abduction of a 
female person for the purpose of unlawful sexual intercourse, 
the Canadian law prescribes only seduction of a female person 
under the age of sixteen.10 This is probably due to the fact 
that abduction is not so much a problem in Canada as in Thailand. 
8. Section 146, Criminal Code 
9. Formerly, this was an offence only if the female person 
was under the age of thirteen. An amendment was made in 
September, 1987 to raise the age for protection to fifteen. 
10. Sections 151-154, Criminal Code. 
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With regard to sexual assault offences however, the laws 
of the two countries differ significantly. The law relating to 
sexual assault in Canada has recently been the subject of a major 
overhaul. By an amendment that came into force in January, 1983, 
Parliament has removed rape as a specific offence and created the 
new sexual assault offences in Section 246. The section does not 
give a definition of the term "sexual assault" and this has given 
rise to different interpretations. In R.V. Chase11, the term 
"sexual" was given its narrow dictionary meaning which limited it 
to sexual organs or genitalia and thus, it was held that mere 
touching of a woman's breast was not a sexual assault. This 
interpretation was soon rejected in favour of a wider approval in 
subsequent cases. For instance, in R.V. Taylor12, it was held 
that a sexual assault was "an act of force in circumstances of 
sexuality" and thus, includes an act which was intended to 
degrade or demean another person for sexual gratification and is 
not limited to acts of force involving the sexual organs. 
It should be noted that these newly created sexual assault 
offences are differentiated according to the degree of violence 
and risk to the victim. Thus, sexual assault under Section 246.1 
is an indictable offence with a maximum penalty of 10 years 
imprisonment; under Section 246.2, sexual assault with a weapon, 
threats to a third party or causing bodily harm is an indictable 
offence with a maximum penalty of 14 years imprisonment; and by 
Section 246.3, aggravated assault is an indictable offence with a 
maximum penalty of life imprisonment. In this way, the degree of 
sexual involvement is a relevant factor to be taken into account 
at the sentencing stage only. 
The advantages of this change have been said to be the 
following: First, the offences are "degenderized" in that they 
11. (1984) 40 C.R. (3rd) 282. 
12. (1984) 44 C.R. (3rd) 263. 
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apply equally to male and female offenders and afford equal 
protection to male and female victims. Second, the use of the 
term "sexual assault" instead of "rape" will widen the 
circumstances under which charges can be broughtl3. 
There are a number of features in Canada's sexual assault 
law which are directly relevant to the central debate for the 
reform of rape laws in Thailand. Rape offence in Thailand is 
still given a very narrow definition. A man is said to have 
committed rape if he has sexual intercourse with a female person 
who is not his wife and the act is carried out by threat or use 
of force14. The act of "sexual intercourse" has consistently 
been interpreted by courts to cover only cases where there is a 
penile penetration of the vagina. All other sexual acts such as 
forced oral sex, sodomy and forcible penetration by other means 
are classified as indecent assaults with a lighter penalty. In 
this way, the Canadian approach may be a better alternative. 
Another important characteristic of the rape law in Thailand 
is that it does not recognize marital rape. Since rape is 
defined as an act of sexual intercourse with a female person who 
is not his wife, it in effect affords to a husband immunity from 
prosecution for rape committed against his wife. Given a history 
of cohabitation and consensual intercourse between spouses, it 
may be difficult to prove lack of consent. However, it is a 
fundamental principle of the criminal law that a substantive 
right should not be denied because of possible procedural 
difficulties. In Canada, this concern seems to have been 
overcome. In the 1983 amendment, Section 246.8 was enacted to 
repeal husband's immunity. This provides that a husband or wife 
may be charged with an offence for sexual assault in respect of 
13. See A New Image for Sexual Offences in Criminal Code: A 
Brief in Response to Bill C-53, NAWL 1981, p.9. 
14. Section 276 of the Thailand Penal Code. 
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his or her spouse whether or not the spouses were living together 
at the time the offence was committed. This corresponds with the 
increasing recognition of marital rape in many other jurisdiction 
such as New Zealand and Australia. 15 It is desirable that rape 
law in Thailand should be amended along this line and this has 
been the position taken by women's groups for many years. 
On the other hand, it has been argued that the new amendment 
may have produced contradictory results. 16 It is said that the 
elimination of the specific offence of "rape" by lumping it under 
the same section of the Code together with other less serious 
forms of sexual assault would have the result of trivializing the 
offence. Also, Lowenberger and Landau argued that it was a 
positive step to abandon the need to prove penetration, but that 
it would have been 
preferable to retain a separate category for sexual assaults 
involving penetration.17 
Added to this, the defence of "honest but mistaken belief in 
consent" remains a stumbling block. This defence has been 
retained in Section 244(4) of the Criminal Code with regard to 
offence of general assault and it appears to be declaratory of 
the common law. Thus, in PapAajohn V. The Oueen18, it was held 
in relation to a charge of rape that an honest but mistaken 
belief by the accused that the victim is consenting, is a defence 
to the charge and that there is no requirement that the belief be 
based on reasonable grounds. It has been urged by some feminists 
15. In Australia, rape reform legislation was introduced 
in 1975 and in New Zealand, it was introduced in 1984. 
16 Ronald Hinch, "Canada's Sexual Assault Law", 
Canadian Public Policy, XIV, No. 3, September, 1988. 
17. Lowenberger, Lois and Reva Landau (1982), "Rape by Any 
Other Name", Broadside, 4:8:4, as quoted in Hinch's article. 
18. (1980) 52 C.C.C. (2d) 481. 
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that a man accused of sexual assault should not be acquitted 
because he mistakenly believed the woman was consenting, while 
other feminists believe that such a defence is justifiable if a 
requirement of reasonableness is added. However, the present 
Section 244(4) seems to give legislative form to the Pappajohn 
approach. 
The rules of evidence applicable to Canadian law on sexual 
assault also deserve to be commended. Section 246.4 of the 
Criminal Code provides that corroboration is not required for 
certain offences, i.e. incest, gross indecency and sexual 
assault. Further, Section 246.6 states that evidence of the 
victim's sexual activity with persons other than the accused is 
not admissible with only three exceptions where the evidence is 
used. These are: 
1. to rebut evidence, adduced by the prosecution 
concerning the complainant's activity or absence 
thereof, 
2. to establish the identity of the person who has sexual 
contact with the complainant on the occasion set out in 
the charge, and 
3. where the evidence concerns sexual activity that took 
place on the same occasion as the sexual activity that 
forms the subject matter of the charge and relates to 
the consent the accused alleges he believed was given 
by the complainant. 
The evidence may be admitted only if the judge, after notice 
has been given to the prosecution and an in-camera hearing in 
which the victim is not a compellable witness has been held, is 
satisfied that the requirement of this section is met. It is 
further stipulated in Section 246.6(4) that the notice given and 
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the evidence taken, the information given or the representation 
made at the hearing referred to above shall not be published in 
any newspaper or broadcast. Also, Section 246.7 provides that 
reputation evidence is not admissible for the purpose of 
challenging or supporting the credibility of the complainant in 
sexual assault cases. 
These provisions in Sections 246.6 and 246.7 are an 
improvement on the general rule of cross-examination applicable 
to sexual assault offences. This is based on the principle of 
non-harassment of victims and consideration for privacy. The 
relevance of sexual activity was severely criticized in the past 
because such evidence was regularly used to imply that there was 
consent, or to undermine the victim's credibility. With the 
introduction of these new provisions, sexual history is no longer 
linked to credibility. This is nothing new. In the United 
States in 1979, 45 American States adopted "rape shield" laws 
designed to limit evidence of the victim's sexual history. It is 
hoped that the Canadian courts will interpret these provisions in 
a way which will afford as much protection as was intended to 
victims of sexual assault offences. Some case law on Section 
246.6 and 246.7 seems encouraging. In R.V. Bird and Peoples19I 
it was argued that the restrictions imposed by these two sections 
prevented the accused from presenting a full and complete case 
in his defence and thus contravened Sections 7 and 11 of the 
Charter. This argument was rejected by the court on the grounds 
that the restrictions are of a procedural nature and are 
reasonable. It was also added that the victim has a right not to 
suffer the negative consequences resulting from disclosure of her 
sexual activity. 
Finally, despite the fact that evidence concerning the 
victim's past sexual conduct is not admissible under the 
19. (1984) 40 C.R. (3d) 41 (Man. Q.B.) 
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legislation, research has shown that the police are still 
reluctant to charge offenders when the sexual or social 
reputations of female victims leave them open to potential 
character assassination in court. A study by Ronald Hinch 20, 
based upon a review of sexual assault complaints received by the 
City of Halifax Police Department in 1984 shows that 500 of the 
women with tarnished sexual or social reputations had their 
complaints dismissed as unfounded but none of the complaints from 
other female victims alleging intercourse were concluded in this 
way. 
It seems, therefore, that more studies and monitoring of the 
present provisions should be conducted in order to find the 
extent to which feminist concerns have been satisfied by the 
implementation of these new provisions. 
In contrast, the Thai Penal Code contains no specific rule 
of evidence applicable to sexual assault offences. This, of 
course, leaves victims of sexual assault offences, especially of 
rape, with no protection from intrusive cross-examination. Thus, 
present evidentiary requirements make it difficult for rape 
victims to secure justice. Corroborated evidence that is 
required to convict the accused is difficult if not impossible to 
gather. It is not surprising therefore, that victims are usually 
reluctant to report the offences. 
Perhaps, the most shocking feature of the rape law in 
Thailand is the fact that the Penal Code, by Section 281, 
provides that unless a rape offence is committed in the presence 
of third parties or the commission of the offence results in 
death or grievous bodily harm, it is a "compoundable" offence. 
This means that the parties can compromise and charges can be 
dropped by paying compensation. This legal provision is highly 
20. Supra 
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repugnant when one considers the grievous violation of the person 
and dignity involved in the offence. It is unacceptable that 
while theft is not compoundable regardless of the amount of 
property involved, a serious offence such as rape should be 
treated as a minor offence which can be settled privately in this 
way. 
In conclusion, it seems that although the present law on 
sexual assault offences in Canada has not solved all the problems 
and much remains to be seen whether it will produce intended 
results, it has advanced many steps ahead of Thailand's sexual 
offence law. It provides a certain level of achievement which 
addresses feminist concerns and which can be a model for similar 
law reforms in Thailand. 
3.2 Prostitution 
The problem concerning prostitution is particularly serious 
in Thailand. Poverty has driven a large number of young girls 
from the rural areas to become prostitutes. The Government's 
policy to promote tourism has accentuated the problem and 
economic gains are being brought about at high cost in human 
terms. 
With regard to the position of prostitution in law, the 
situations in Thailand and Canada are quite similar. In both 
countries, prostitution is not a crime in itself but the law 
regulates its visibility and public nuisance problems. The 
substance of the laws governing prostitution in both countries 
may be summarized as follows. It is an offence to keep or to own 
a bawdy-house, to live or to be found in a bawdy-house2l and to 
21 Section 193, the Criminal Code of Canada 
Section 1, the Restraining of Prostitution Act 1960 of 
Thailand 
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procure a person for the purpose of prostitution.22 Further, it 
is an offence for a person to live wholly or in part on the 
avails of prostitution of another person23. A most significant 
and controversial issue in Canada is the offence of soliciting in 
a public place for the purpose of prostitution24. This last 
category is also an offence in Thai prostitution law.25 
In both Canada and Thailand, the enforcement of laws on 
prostitution has not produced desirable results. In Thailand, 
the laws relating to prostitution are simply dead letters. They 
are loosely, if at all, enforced both at the police and the 
judicial levels. The extent of the problem, as world-wide 
publicity demonstrates, speaks for itself. In Canada, although 
prostitution is not so much a social problem as in Thailand, 
difficulties exist as to where the law should stand in relation 
to prostitution. 
Section 195.1 of the Criminal Code in effect provides that 
it is an offence to solicit in a public place for the purpose of 
prostitution. Here the legislation has failed to offer a clear 
definition. In Hutt,26 the Supreme Court of Canada held that the 
act must be "pressing and persistent" in order to warrant a 






Section 195(1), the Criminal Code of Canada 
Sections 282-284, the Penal Code of Thailand 
Section 195 (1), the Criminal Code of Canada 
Section 286, the Penal Code 
Section 195.1 the criminal code 
Section 1, the Restraining of Prostitution Act 
(1978) 38 C.C.C. (2d) 418 (S.C.C.) 
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has recommended that this offence should be removed from the 
Criminal Code.27 It has been argued that Section 195.1 is 
enforced largely by entrapment and not by specific complaints 
from ordinary citizens who have been harassed. Also, it has been 
pointed out that the section would perpetrate the double standard 
of sexuality prevalent in society; that is, women are punished 
for making_ their sexuality available for a price, whereas it is 
acceptable for men to be sexually promiscuous. Further, the mere 
fact that a customer may be charged under the section does not 
guarantee non-discriminatory enforcement. For instance, in 
Toronto, in 1982, 80.8 per cent of those charged with soliciting 
were women.28 
of major concern is the fact that by restricting the ways 
that prostitutes can meet customers, prostitutes would be forced 
to rely to an even greater extent on pimps to make business 
contacts. The reinforcement of this dependence means that 
prostitutes are more vulnerable to the physical and mental abuse 
associated with pimping. It has been submitted that the 
existence of legislation against bawdy-houses is an encouragement 
to street soliciting rather than a deterrence to prostitution. 
Street soliciting is a product of the absence of more suitable 




See Suzanne P. Boivin, "Soliciting for the Purpse of 
Prostitution", A Brief Presented Before the Special 
-Committee on Pornography and Prostitution, February 
1984. 
L. McDonald, Memo to Community Groups on Soliciting. 
April 1983, as quoted in Boivin's article. 
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Much of this problem applies to a large extent in Thailand. 
For three decades, the laws on prostitution have remained 
unchanged. The Penal Code, Section 286 makes it an offence for 
anyone over the age of sixteen to live in whole or in part on the 
avails of prostitution of another person. Also it prohibits 
procurement of female persons for the purpose of prostitution. 
The major problems of the law in this area is its lack of 
enforcement and its being out of touch with economic reality. 
Low prices for agricultural produce and poverty in the rural 
areas mean that more and more young girls are forced to become 
prostitutes. Unfortunately, the government has paid little 
attention to this problem and still pursues its goal of the 
promotion of the tourist industry. The legitimization of bars 
and massage parlours make it more convenient to conduct the 
business of prostitution. This, coupled with wide scale 
corruption among the police means that this business is carried 
on with little intervention from the State. The saddest thing is 
it is not the prostitutes who are benefiting from the trade. 
Usually it is the brothel keepers, pimps and procurers of 
prostitutes who are getting all the fruits of their hard labour. 
It is highly disturbing to find that the age of young persons 
engaging in prostitution gets lower each year and it may have 
come down as low as twelve. 
Further, the enforcement of the law is purely dis- 
criminatory. on any rare occasion when the police take action, 
only prostitutes would be arrested. Though the law allows the 
court a discretion to use rehabilitation measures to supplement 
criminal sanctions, this has proved of little value to the 
prostitutes. The Restraining of Prostitution Act provides that 
the Court, if it thinks fit, may make an order to detain 
prostitutes in a rehabilitation centre where they will be treated 
for the sexually transmitted diseases they are suffering from and 
where they may be provided with training in certain skills. This 
is supposed to enable them to engage in other occupations which 
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require the skills they received from their training. The 
detention period as specified by the Act can range up to a 
maximum of one year. From my study of 100 cases brought for 
prostitution offences at Chiangmai district court in 1984, it was 
found that 98 per cent of the accused escaped on bail. This 
should be surprising since the usual penalty inflicted by the 
court is only a 200 baht fine, an amount five times less than the 
amount forfeited for failing to appear in court. An obvious 
explanation given by judges and court officials was that these 
women feared that the court would make a recommendation to detain 
them in a rehabilitation centre. During the detention period, 
they would not be able to earn any income and this could produce 
hardship both on themselves and their families. Besides, the 
provision for skill training is of little help since it is more 
than likely that they would not be able to find any employment 
upon their release. 
what then should be the position taken by the law in 
relation to prostitution. As we have seen above, Canada and 
Thailand seem to have taken similar stands and this has produced 
problems concerning law enforcement. In some other 
jurisdictions, prostitution has been legalized. Prostitution and 
related activities are regulated through the use of zoning by- 
laws, brothel licensing or licensing of the prostitutes 
themselves. The use of zoning by-laws confines legal 
prostitution to a specific area. Any prostitution activities 
carried on outside the defined geographical space is subject to 
legal sanctions. However, confining prostitution in such manner 
does not solve problems associated with prostitution. The 
concentration of prostitution tends to attract other criminal 
elements. Furthermore such legislation makes no attempt to deal 
with the social and economic causes of prostitution. 
In some jurisdictions, prostitutes are required to obtain 
licensing and health cards from municipal authorities in order to 
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practice their trade. The requirement of registration only 
accentuates the social stigmatization endured by prostitutes. 
Women are often reluctant to register and, once registered, have 
difficulty in finding other employment. Also this type of 
regulation does not address the root causes of prostitution. 
The legalization of prostitution in licensed brothels allows 
prostitutes to conduct their business in private, thereby solving 
the public nuisance problems which derive from street soliciting. 
Once again this type of licensing scheme does not solve the 
social and economic causes of prostitution. 
From time to time, these alternative stands of the law have 
been a subject of debate in prostitution law reforms in Thailand. 
There was a time in 1985 that a proposal was made by a prominent 
women's group to introduce some licensing or registration scheme 
for prostitutes. The idea was widely opposed on the grounds that 
it would accentuate the social stigmatization of prostitutes, and 
that legalization of prostitution in this way would lower 
community moral standards. 
Currently in Canada, there has been a suggestions from 
various women's organizations to repeal the Criminal Code 
provision concerning street soliciting. During the general 
election campaign in October and November, 1988, the three major 
political parties have given some indication of their policies in 
relation to prostitution. The Conservatives have stated that 
they would introduce amendments to the Criminal Code to 
strengthen provisions regarding street soliciting. These 
amendments would include a mandatory Parliamentary Review of the 
effectiveness of the legislation beginning from December 1988 
onwards. The Liberals have shown disapproval of the existing 
legislation on street soliciting. They believe it has driven 
prostitution underground. The New Democratic Party is strongly 
opposed to what it considers the repressive criminal legislation 
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against prostitution. Therefore it is likely that some kind of 
amendments to the existing legislation will be introduced no 
matter which Government is elected. 
Lastly, something must be said about child or juvenile 
prostitution. At the moment, there is no law dealing directly 
with the problem of child prostitution both in Canada and 
Thailand. The most applicable provisions are the sections 
concerning sexual offences committed by having sexual intercourse 
with a child under the age of fourteen, even with the child's 
consent. Also the Code provides for the offences of having 
sexual intercourse with female persons under the age of sixteen 
and seduction of female persons between sixteen and eighteen.29 
Juveniles can also be protected by the section providing that 
procuring a person to become a prostitute is an offence.30 
Similar provisions exist in the Penal Code of Thailand with the 
exception that the age of children protected from sexual offence 
is fifteen.31 
These provisions have failed to deal adequately with the 
problems of juvenile prostitution. In Canada, the Badgley Report 
makes a number of recommendations with respect to the Criminal 
law. These include a strengthenng and broadening of Section 195 
(soliciting in a public place) relating to pimps, creating an 
offence of buying or offering to buy sexual services from a 
person under eighteen and expanding the offence of soliciting. 
29 
30 
Sections 140, 146 and 151 of the Criminal Code of 
Canada 
Section 195 Criminal Code 
31 Sections 277-279, 282-285, the Penal Code. 
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The Report also recommends restrictions on the access of children 
to pornography.32 On January 1, 1988, Bill C-15, an Act to amend 
the Criminal Code and the Canada Evidence Act became law in 
Canada. This legislation contains specific provisions relating 
to juvenile prostitutes which impose a criminal saction against 
customers of young prostitutes and a harsher penalty for living 
on the avails of juvenile prostitution. 
In Thailand, despite the seriousness of the problem 
concerning juvenile prostitution, the issue has received little 
attention from the Government. Unless economic and social 
programs are promoted to ameliorate the root causes of 
prostitution, law can hardly be an instrument for solving this 
problem. 
3.3 Abortion 
Laws on abortion have created much controversy in many 
countries as well as in Thailand and Canada. The difficulty is 
whether the right of the pregnant woman to make the choice 
regarding whether or not to have an abortion should be paramount 
to any right of the fetus and how these competing interests can 
be resolved. A lot of discussion centres around the question of 
when life begins and whether it is murder to abort the fetus. 
Canada inherited from England its original law on abortion. 
Prior to the nineteenth Gentry, abortion, was only a crime if it 
occurred after quickening (i.e. after the mother had felt the 
fetus move, usually between the 16th and 20th weeks of 
pregnancy). In 1803 Lord Ellenborough's Act made abortion at any 
32 Sexual Offences Against Children (1984), Report of the 
Committee on Sexual Offences Against Children, p. 95- 
97. 
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stage a statutory offence.33 The abortion provisions of the Act 
were redrafted in 1828, 1887 and 1861. The 1861 Offences Against 
the Person Act made minor changes to the abortion section. 
Section 58 of the 1861 Act remained the law on abortion in 
Britain until 1967 and the basis for it in Canada until 1953. 
The section specified that the offence was an unlawful 
administering of poison or an unlawful use of instruments to 
procure a miscarriage. This definition implied that there might 
be a lawful act to procure an abortion and it was recognized by 
some physicians that there was a category of lawful abortions 
which could be induced as a therapeutic measure when the life of 
the mother is seriously endangered. This category was 
acknowledged and extended in R.V. Bourne34I in which an abortion 
performed without payment on a fourteen year old girl who had 
been violently raped was held to be lawful. 
Although limited numbers of therapeutic abortions could be 
done as a result of the Bourne decision, there was still much 
confusion over what was necessary to come within the case law 
test. Doctors could not be sure what was legal and what was not. 
Also the test in Bourne did not include eugenic, social and 
economic considerations as grounds for abortions. It was not 
until the early 1960's that there was any indication of public 
debate on this issue in Canada. The Canadian Medical Association 
and the United Church of Canada had passed resolutions at their 
annual meetings that abortions should be permitted where the 
health of the mother was at risk. In December 1968, Bill C-150 
was introduced to amend the Criminal Code and became law in 
August 1969. The abortion provisions involved a very modest 
reform. It merely formalized what was already the practice in 
many Canadian hospitals. Its definition of therapeutic abortion 
was as restrictive as the definition in the Bourne decision. 
33 43 Geo. III, C.58 (1803), U.K., Section 3. 
34 (1939) 1 K.B. 687 
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Further, a great number of administrative and procedural 
requirements were added. The abortion law was contained in 
Section 251 of the Criminal Code. In substance, Parliament 
legalized abortions where they are performed in a hospital after 
being approved by a therapeutic abortion committee on the ground 
that the continuation of the pregnancy would endanger the 
mother's life or health. It was under this section that Dr. 
Morgentaler, who operates abortion clinics in major Canadian 
cities, was charged and subsequently acquitted. 
At the same time, great changes were occurring in the United 
States where the abortion laws were undergoing the scrutiny of 
the U.S. Supreme Court. In Roe V. Wade,35 it was decided that a 
woman had an unfettered right to an abortion during her first 
three months of pregnancy. These events along with mounting 
public pressure within Canada prompted the Federal Minister of 
Justice to appoint the "Committee on the Operation of the 
Abortion Law" (The Badgely Committee) to investigate and report 
on whether the amended abortion law was operating "equitably" 
across Canada. The Committee found that the procedures set out 
for the operation of the abortion law were not working equitably 
across Canada. They also found that there were sharp disparities 
in the distribution and the accessibility of therapeutic abortion 
services. They calculated that 45 per cent of Canada's 
population did not have access to hospitals with a therapeutic 
abortion committee. 36 Some hospitals lacked committees because 
they failed to meet the criteria laid down by Section 251 or by 
provinces, or because they choose not to establish a committee. 
35 (1973) 410 U.S. 113 
36 Report of the Committee on the Operation of the 
Abortion Law (Badgley Report), Ottawa: Minister of Supply and 
Services, 1977. p. 109. 
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With the enactment of the Charter, the abortion debate once 
again surfaced. Dr. Morgentaler, by opening abortion clinics in 
both Winnipeg, and Toronto and claiming that the abortion law is 
inadequate, has forced the public and the Government to consider 
the state of the law. Arguing on the other side of this delicate 
issue is an equally vocal group know as the Right to Life 
Association which claims that the Canadian abortion law is too 
lenient in allowing a woman easy access to an abortion. 
In January, 1988, the Supreme Court of Canada decided a very 
important case affecting the law on abortion. In Morgentaler, 
Smoling and Scott v. The Queen 37 the accused were charged with 
conspiracy to procure a miscarriage contrary to SS.251(1) and 
423(1)(d) of the Criminal Code. The accused were acquitted at 
trial but a Crown appeal against the acquittal was allowed and a 
new trial ordered. On appeal by the accused from the judgement 
of the Ontario Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, it 
was argued that Section 251 of the Criminal Code was 
unconstitutional, inter alia, on the basis that it offends the 
guarantee to life, liberty and security of the person in Section 
7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Supreme 
Court decided that the appeal should be allowed and the 
acquittals restored. In the opinion of Dickson C.J.C., Section 
251 of the Criminal Code does infringe the guarantee to security 
of the person. It interferes with a woman's bodily integrity in 
both a physical and emotional sense. Moreover, the operation of 
the decision-making mechanism set out in Section 251 causes delay 
for women who are successful in meeting its criteria and in the 
context of abortion, any unnecessary delay can have profound 
consequences on the woman's physical and emotional well-being. 
While Parliament may not have intended to create delays in 
obtaining therapeutic abortions, the evidence demonstrated that 




the system established by Section 251 inevitably does create 
significant delays. In the Court's opinion, it is not merely the 
purpose which is the only appropriate criteria in evaluating the 
consitutionality of legislation under the Charter. Thus, Section 
251 infringes the guarantee to security of the person in a manner 
which does not accord with the principles of fundamental justice 
and should thus be struck down. 
Therefore, the situation now is that Canada does not have 
specific law on abortion. In the nine months since Section 251 
was struck down, the Government has not produced any draft 
legislation. It will depend on the newly elected Government to 
enact new abortion law and it is undoubtedly difficult to 
legislate law which satisfies all sides. The NDP have supported 
freedom of choice on the abortion issue while the liberals have 
indicated that they would support women's right to choose in the 
early stages of pregnancy. As for the Conservatives, they would 
allow a free vote to give direction on abortion legislation. 
In the light of all this, on October 3 and 4. 1988 the 
Supreme Court of Canada heard the case of Borowski v. The 
Attorney-General of Canada. The action was brought by Borowski 
on behalf of all the fetuses. He argued that the fetus is a 
"person" entitled to the constitutional protections guaranteed by 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This case had been given 
leave to appeal from a Saskatchewan Court of Appeal judgment 
before the Morgentaler decision was made. It has been argued 
both by the Government lawyer and by the Women's Legal Education 
and Action Fund (LEAF) which appeared as intervener in the case, 
that the case should not be heard by the court outside the 
context of a specific piece of legislation. This case put the 
court in a difficult position. It reserved its decision on 
whether Mr. Borowski's case ought to be heard. It allowed him to 
go ahead and present his evidence and arguments, including the 
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screening of anti-abortion films that depicted the fetus moving 
in the womb of its mother. 
Another rival of the pro-choice movement is a cry for 
fathers' right to have a say in an abortion, both in the United 
States and Canada. In the United States, many states tried to 
get around the Supreme Court's 1973 Roe v. Wade decision by 
passing laws that required the father's notification and consent. 
In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court effectively struck down these 
laws, ruling in the Danforth case38 that no state legislation 
could "delegate to a spouse a veto power which the state itself 
is absolutely and totally prohibited from exercising during the 
first semester of pregnancy." In Canada, there have been several 
recent cases where a father has brought an application for an 
injunction to prevent his wife from having the abortion. The 
conclusion reached by the courts has been that a father has no 
right either in common law or statute law to be consulted with 
respect to the termination of a pregnancy.39 However the 
assertion of parental rights is gaining momentum. In July 1988, 
an application made by an Edmonton man to extend a two-day 
injunction preventing his ex-girlfriend from having an abortion 
was refused by an Alberta Court of Queen's Bench judge. In her 
ruling, the trial judge said the father could still sue for 
damages if his ex-girlfriend had the abortion. 
An examination of Thai abortion law presents much the same 
difficulty but with less intense debate and legal battle than in 
Canada. The law concerning abortion was enacted for the first 
time in 1956 and has remained unchanged. By Sections 301-305 of 
the Penal Code, it is an offence for a female person to procure 
her own miscarriage and for any person to procure the miscarriage 
38 See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri V. Central 
Missouri and Danforth (1976) 96 S. Ct. 2831. 
39 See Medhurst V. Medhurst (1984) 46 O.R. (sd) 262 
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of any female person. However, lawful abortions can be performed 
by a qualified physician if he or she is of the opinion that the 
pregnancy of such female person would endanger her "health", or 
if the pregnancy is a result of the commission of rape or other 
sexual offences. There is no definition to the term "health" and 
this in practice has been interpreted broadly by physicians to 
cover abortions based on eugenic considerations, for instance in 
cases where there is a substantial chance of deformity of the 
fetus. Unlike in Canada, the anti-abortion movement is not so 
well organized and therefore unlawful abortion 'was widely 
available with virtually no opposition. However, a recent 
proposal to change the abortion law which would widen the 
circumstances in which abortion can be performed, and thereby 
make what has already existed in practice legal, met with 
opposition from some religious groups. This proposed Bill would 
amend Section 304 of the Penal Code, adding to it two more 
permitted grounds for abortions. These are abortions based on 
eugenic considerations and abortions where use of contraception 
has failed to prevent pregnancy. The Bill is expected to be 
introduced into Parliament in 1989. 
The controversy centred around the issue of abortion 
reflects how difficult it is to determine where the law should 
stand. In Thailand, the most pressing reason for reform of the 
abortion law was that illegal abortions continue to exist and 
backstreet abortions often result in death or great danger to the 
health of the woman. Though abortion services are largely 
available in private clinics, this is beyond the reach of the 
poor. The only available statistics are from a study of patients 
admitted after having an abortion between 1968 and 1978 in a big 
state hospita1.40 It was found that there were 4,497 women who 
had to be admitted as a result of backstreet abortions. This led 
40 A study by Amorn Kurtsawang et al, quoted in "Facts 
Concerning Abortion in Thailand", 1978. 
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to death in many cases. It has been argued that by increasing 
the availability of therapeutic abortions, this undesirable cost 
of human life and expenses in providing treatment could be 
avoided. 
One argument which has been advanced by the anti-abortion 
movement in Thailand (apart from the argument that an abortion is 
a murder of the fetus) is that making abortions available would 
encourage the society to become promiscuous. This contradicts 
the facts obtained from the above study which found that only 
37.1 per cent of the patients were single women, and in the 
majority or 61.9 per cent of the cases, the patients were married 
women who wanted abortions for economic and social reasons. 
In the final analysis, one has to admit that strict abortion 
law does not stop abortions from being performed. Instead, in a 
poor country like Thailand this has evidently led to negative 
results. Further, the existing law hardly corresponds with 
reality. It merely forces women to turn to illegal abortions. 
In Canada, the issue has serious implications for women's 
equality rights as guaranteed by the Charter. This coupled with 
the strong anti-abortion movement will make it even harder to 
legislate on the matter. 
3.4 Domestic Violence 
Violence can take many forms ranging from verbal violence or 
"threatening" to physical assault. Usually women and children 
are more vulnerable to intra-familial violence than men. In 
Canada, at least 1 in 8 women is battered by her male partner.41 
It is also reported that 36 per cent of wife abusers also abuse 
41 Linda MacLeod, Battered But No Beaten... Preventing 
Wife Battering in Canada, Ottawa, the Canadian Advisory Council 
on the Status of Women, 1987. 
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children living in the home.42 Strictly speaking, all forms of 
assaults, no matter against whom they are committed, are 
prohibited by the criminal law. However, domestic violence seems 
to present more problems concerning enforcement because it is 
usually committed within the institution of the family. 
Complaints made by battered wives tend not to be treated 
seriously and are often regarded by the police as domestic 
affairs in which they should not intervene. 
At the moment both Thailand and Canada have no specific laws 
governing domestic violence. Therefore, charges are still based 
on the general law of assault. In Canada, several of the 
Provincial Attorneys General and the Federal Solictor General 
have guidelines requiring the police and Crown Attorneys to lay 
and pursue criminal charges against assaultative partners as a 
matter of routine rather than as exceptional procedures.43 The 
provinces which have issued guidelines regarding the processing 
of domestic violence cases are British Columbia, Manitoba and 
Ontario. These guidelines represent a marked improvement over 
the considerable discretion previously available to police and 
Crown Attorneys. A recent study regarding the use of these 
guidelines in Manitoba found that more domestic violence ases are 
being brought into the system.44 
In Thailand, the problem of domestic violence had received 
little attention until 1987. In February 1987, a workshop was 
organized by a women's group called Women's Information Centre in 
Bangkok, which widely publicized the magnitude of the problem for 
42 Metro Torono Advisory Commitee at Reference 2 
43Caroline J. Coates, "The Need for an Informed Response to 
Domestic Violence", Canadian Community Law Journal, Vol. 8 
(1985), p. 53. 
44 Jane E. Ursel and Dawn Farough, "The Legal and Public 
Response to the New Wife. Abuse Directive in Manitoba", Canadian 
Journal of Criminology, Vol. 28, No. 2 (April 1986) pp. 171-172 
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the first time. There have been calls on the Government to 
introduce legal and social measures to deal with the problems. 
Up until now there has not been any action taken on the part of 
the Government. It has also been suggested that the police force 
should be educated to understand the problems and the necessity 
of strict enforcement of the law. However, no guidelines or 
directives have been issued. 
There are a number of proposals for law reform in this area. 
In 1986, the Law Reform Commission (LRC) of Canada proposed that 
assaults committed against a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, 
or grandparent should be treated as aggravated assaults.45 The 
proposal would differentiate between the substantive offences of 
assault by touching or hurting and assault by harming but would 
add a section listing aggravating features (familial 
relationship, use of a weapon) that would escalate the sentence 
available for the crime.46 According to the LRC, the 
redefinition of the offence of assault is not necessary but the 
"special risk" to family members should be an aggravating feature 
of the offence.47 Similarly, at the workshop on domestic 
violence in Bangkok in Februaryl987, it was suggested that 
"spousal relationship" should be added to the list of aggravating 
factors in Section 289 of the Penal Code which would impose a 
higher sentence for the offence of assault.48 This would have 
an indirect effect of creating an awareness that wife assault is 
a crime. 
45 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Recodifying Criminal 
Law, Volume 1, Ottawa, 1986, "Report 30" 
46 Ibid, pp. 58-68 
47 Ibid, p. 38 
48 K. Rayanakorn, "Legal Measures for Domestic Violence", 
a paper presented at the Workshop on Domestic Violence, Bangkok, 
February 1989. 
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Domestic violence has been criminalized as a separate 
offence by several American states and by the Australian State of 
New South Wales. 49 The proponents of this approach argue that 
the gathering of valuable statistics will be understood by all 
that wife assault is a crime.50 However, this offence would 
still require dedicated law enforcement, and it has been 
suggested that it should be supplemented by legislation requiring 
mandatory arrest and prosecution in certain domestic violence 
situations involving bodily harm. In Australia and the United 
States, the traditional discretion of the police and Crown 
Attorneys to decide whether particular cases will be prosecuted 
has been eliminated or curtailed by state legislation. For 
instance, in Mississippi, "every law enforcement official who 
receives a report of domestic violence must immediately file 
charges against the abuser on behalf of the victim if the facts 
submitted to him or her are sufficient.i51 The main objective of 
such laws is to transform prosecutorial attitudes and policies 
and to increase conviction rates for wife assault. 
There are some disadvantages associated with this type of 
"no drop" law. One obvious problem is the question of abused 
partners' reluctance to testify and that women may be forced to 
choose between imprisonment for contempt and testifying in court. 
It has been suggested that a possible legislative solution to 
this problem is to adopt a legislative exception along the lines 
49 See Elizabeth L. A. Sheehy, Personal Autonomy and the 
Criminal Law: Emerging Issues for Women, Canadian Advisory 
Counsil on the Status of Women, September 1987, p. 13 
50 Lisa G. Lerman and Sharon Goldzweig," Protection of 
Battered Women: A Survey of State Legislation" Women's Rights 
Law Reporters, vol. 6, no. 4, 1980, pp. 271-284, as quoted in 
Sheehy's paper. 
51 e Lisa G. Lerman and Franci Livingston, "State 
Legislation on Somestic Violence", Respnse to Violence in the 
Family and Sexual Assault, vol. 6, no. 5, 1983, p. 1-28 as quoted 
in Sheehy's paper. 
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of the New South Wales Act. Under this legislaiton, the 
prosecutor has no discretion to drop charges, and usually a 
reluctant victim must testify. However, the judge hearing the 
charges has the power to excuse the witness from testifying 
"having regard to the availability of other evidence and the 
seriousness of the offence in question",52 provided that the 
decision by the victim was made without fear or coercion. 
The legal measures suggested above should be considered for 
law reforms in relation to domestic violence in Canada and 
Thailand. Changes could be made to both the substantive law of 
assault and the procedural laws regarding arrest and prosecution 
of charges. Along with this, there should be police training and 
victim support services such as shelters and counselling to 
provide effective solutions to the problem. 
4. Women and Family Law 
The topics concerning family law are generally broad and 
difficult. In Canada, this area of law is further complicated by 
the fact that most family law matters fall within provincial 
authority. The Canadian Constitution grants to the federal 
Parliament exclusive authority to legislate regarding the 
capacity to marry and divorce.53 These laws apply across Canada 
and are the same in all jurisdictions. The provinces may make 
laws about all other aspects of marriage breakdown, such as 
property division, support of spouses and children, and 
custody.54 Thus the law relating to these issues varies widely 
across Canada. In Thailand, virtually all family law provisions 





See Sheehy, Supra, p. 18 
The Constitution Act 1867, Section 92 (26) 
Ibid, Section 92 (12) and (13) 
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The focus for family law reforms is also very different 
between Thailand and Canada. In Thailand, most of the 
dissatisfaction centres around some discriminatory provisions in 
the CCC, Book V. The provisions often cited are the sections 
dealing with the subject of betrothal and the sections specifying 
grounds for divorce. Surprisingly little discussion, and I have 
not come across any, is given to the consequences of divorce or 
marriange breakdown. In Canada, on the other hand, the debates 
now concern mainly with issues following a marriage breakdown, 
namely questions of maintenance and support, access and custody, 
and appropriate procedure for settling marital disputes. 
4.1 Betrothel 
I pick out this topic because it has generated quite an 
amount of debate in Thailand whereas in Canada, this is hardly 
an issue. According to common law in Canada, a promise to marry 
another person is recognized as a legally binding contract. An 
engagement gift, almost always a ring, is given as a bond 
indicating that the couple has agreed to wed. If the parties 
mutually agree to break off the engagement, the woman is obliged 
to return the gift. On the other hand, if the man calls off the 
engagement without a valid reason, the woman is free to keep the 
gift. While the courts cannot compel the parties to marry, a 
party has the right to sue the breaching party for damages such 
as damage to one's pride and feelings and loss of money in 
preparing for the wedding ceremony.55 
Much of the same principle applies in the CCC, Book V.56 In 
addition, the law specifies the age at which a couple can legally 
enter into an engagement contract. Section 1437 provides that an 
55 M.J. Dymond (ed), The Canadian Woman's Legal Guide, 
Doubleday Canada Ltd., Toronto, 1987, pp. 112-113. 
56 CCC, Book V, Seciton 1435-1447 
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engagement can take place only if the man and the woman have 
reached the age of seventeen. 
The provisions which have been constantly criticized are 
those which seem to reflect the prevalent concept that treats a 
woman as a piece of property. For instance, by Section 1437(3), 
a man may give betrothal security to the parents or guardian of 
the women in return for the woman agreeing to marry. If the 
marriage does not take place, the man may claim the return of the 
property. Of particular concern to feminists are the sections 
which provide for renunciation of a betrothal agreement. Section 
1445 provides that a man who is betrothed to a woman may, after 
having renounced the betrothal agreement, claim compensation from 
any man who has had sexual intercourse with the woman and has 
known or ought to have known of her betrothal. Further, Section 
1446 provides that a man who is betrothed to a woman may, without 
having to renounce the betrothal agreement, claim compensation 
from any man who has had sexual intercourse or attempted to have 
sexual intercourse with the woman against her will, if the fact 
that the woman had been betrothed has been known to him. 
These seem to be peculiar provisions and even more so when 
considering the fact that the CCC, Book V, 1976 is a revised 
version of family law with an aim to equalize the status of men 
and women. As stated earlier, this revision was prompted by the 
specific provision of equality rights between men and women in 
the 1974 Constitution. It is strange that an act of sexual 
intercourse committed on the body of a female person should give 
rise to a claim for compensation on the part of her fiance. This 
is so even if the woman has consented to the act. One cannot 
help concluding that these provisions are to reinforce certain 
cultural values in Thai society that hold a woman to be property 
belonging to her parents before marriage, to her fiancd once 
engaged, and to her husband once married. 
37 
4.2 Formation of Marriage 
In order for a marriage to be valid, several requirements 
must be met. These concerns relate to age, mental competence, 
consent, consangunity or affinity, and monogamy. 
In substance the law of the two countries are quite similar 
in their requirements for creating a valid marriage. According 
to the CCC, Book V of Thailand, Section 1448, the minimum age for 
marriage of both male and female is seventeen. The age of 
majority under Thai law is twenty. Any person below the age of 
majority and who wished to marry must obtain his or her parents' 
consent. If the parents unreasonably withhold their consent, he 
or she can appeal the parental decision to the court. Marriages 
between people related by consangunity, affinity and adoption are 
prohibited. Other essential capacities as specified by Thai law 
are that there must be no prior existing marriage and the couple 
must not be insane at the time of the marriage.57 
It is worth noting that the law recognizes the principle of 
monogamy despite the fact that under the former Husband and Wife 
Law dated from 1361 to 1935, a man could legally have as many 
wives as he could afford to. Today the law permits a man to have 
only one wife but it is still quite a common social phenomenon 
that a man has more than one wife. Unlike Canadian law, bigamy 
is not a criminal offence under Thai law. 
The CCC, Book V does not specify ceremonial requirement for 
a marriage. A valid marriage can be created simply by 
registering it at a district office with the consent of both 
parties, whereby a certificate of marriage is issued. According 
to Section 14571 only registered marriages are considered to be 
valid. Thus the law does not recognize cohabitation without a 
57 Ibid, Section 1448 - 1454 
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marriage certificate; the union of a man and a woman does not 
confer mutual conjugal rights and obligations. 
In Canada, the federal government has authority to legislate 
on the topic of marital capacity but it has not generally done 
so. That being the case, it is the common law as modified by any 
relevant statutes that governs. While in common law, the minimum 
age for marriage of male was fourteen and a female was twelve, 
these being the ages at which the sexes were considered capable 
of reproduction, today the age at which a person can marry has 
been raised by virtue of the provinces' and territories' 
enactment of statutes requiring parental consent to marriage 
below a certain age. This age limit which varies across Canada, 
may be as low as twelve or as high as eighteen. The age at which 
a person may marry without parental consent is sixteen in 
Newfoundland, eighteen in Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, Prince 
Edward Island, Saskatchewan and New Brunswick, nineteen in Nova 
Scotia, British Columbia, the Northwest Territories and the Yukon 
Territory. In Quebec, a girl may marry at twelve and a boy at 
fourteen.58 
With regard to the formalities concerning marriage, the 
province has the power under Section 92 (12) of the Constitution 
Act, 1967, to legislate for the solemnization of marriage. The 
provinces have enacted recent, comprehensive legislation 
concerning marriage. For instance, in Ontario, the Marriage Act 
deals with such preliminary formalities as the need for a licence 
or banns, who can officiate, the form of the ceremony, and 
registration of the marriage.59 All of these provisions clearly 
relate to the formal validity of marriage and the province has 
58 
p. 117 
M.J. Dymond, The Canadian Woman's Legal Guide, supra, 
59 See the Marriage Act, R.S.O. 1980, Chap 256. 
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the constitutional power to legislate that any marriage which 
does not comply is invalid. 
One point I would like to make with regard to formalities 
concerning marriage is that Canadian law seems to specify more 
ceremonial requirements whereas the Thai law only requires 
registration. This is probably due to religious influences that 
have rooted the concept of the family and the sanctity of 
marriage deeply into Canadian society. It also explains why it 
is much more difficult to get a divorce under Canadian law than 
under Thai law. 
Upon marriage, a Thai woman must adopt her husband 's 
surname.60 This has given rise to concern for some middle class 
women who wish to retain their maiden name or hyphenate their 
surname and that of their husband. In 1984, a draft legislation 
was introduced into Parliament to amend the Person's Name Act. 
The amendment would allow women to elect to keep their maiden 
name or to use their husband's name. This proposal did not pass 
the first reading. Therefore, married women are still compelled 
to use their husband's surname. In Canada, there is no 
legislation on the matter and it is generaly understood that 
there is no legal obligation for women to adopt their husband's 
name. 
4.3 Divorce 
In Thailand, the law specifying grounds for divorce is the 
area of family law which attracts most criticism from feminists. 
The attack is centred around the double standard in the 
provision. The Civil and Commercial Code, Book V, which was 
first enacted in 1935, recognized the western concept of 
monogamy. However, as stated at the beginning of this paper, 
this early version of the family law still discriminated against 
60 The Person's Name Act, 1962 
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women in many ways. As far as divorce is concerned, the 1935 
family law provided that adultery as a ground for divorce was 
available only to a husband. 
When the family law was revised in compliance with the 
equality rights clause in the 1974 Constitution, an attempt was 
made to improve the obviously unequal treatment of women in the 
family law. Women are now given equal right in the management of 
matrimonial property and in the exercise of parental rights. 
They are also entitled to equal share in the division of property 
upon marriage breakdown. As regards divorce, the present Section 
1516 of the CCC, Book V lists ten grounds which a spouse may 
invoke for divorce. Some of the grounds listed are based on the 
principle of fault or matrimonial offence and some are based on 
the concept of permanent marriage breakdown. The matrimonial 
offence grounds include for example adultery, grievous 
misconduct, physical and mental cruelty. The grounds for divorce 
based on permanent marriage breakdown include whereabouts of 
spouse unknown, nonconsummation, desertion, and illness through 
transmitted diseases. 
The provision in question which is constantly attacked is 
subsection (1) concerning adultery ground. This subsection 
provides that where a husband has given maintenance to or 
honoured such other woman as his wife or where a wife commits 
adultery, the other spouse may enter a claim for divorce. 
Reading this subsection carefully, one can see a subtle 
discrimination against women. In order to file a divorce action, 
it is not enough for a wife to prove that her husband has 
committed adultery. She must show that her husband has given 
maintenance or honoured another woman as his wife whereas a 
husband needs only prove that his wife has committed adultery. 
Although this provision is a marked improvement on the 
previous law which allowed the husband alone to invoke adultery 
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as a ground with virtually no comparable ground available to 
women, it certainly implies an underlying value in Thai society 
where it is acceptable for men to be promiscuous. When it comes 
to women, the society applies a much stricter standard. It puts 
a high value on women's virginity before marriage and it bears an 
expectation of women's being a good housewife and loyal to only 
one man after marrriage. 
Where a divorce is uncontested, it is far easier to obtain 
in Thailand than in Canada. Sections 1514 and 1515 of the CCC, 
Book V provide that where a divorce is uncontested, it is 
completed by registering an agreement to divorce with an 
appropriate authority, which is usually a district office. This 
must be accompanied by another written agreement specifying the 
spouse who will have custody of the children and the61 amount of 
support each spouse would contribute. If no agreement can be 
reached as to custody and support, this will be determined by the 
court. In practice, however, few people would go to court. The 
parties would normally reach an agreement to complete a divorce 
procedure. No study has yet been conducted as to the 
consequences of divorce. This may be due to the fact that 
divorce is an uncommon phenomenon in Thai society. Or it may 
mean that there are so few feminist lawyers that all aspects of 
the law relating to women have not yet been looked into. 
Thus, the divorce procedure in Thailand is more or less 
close to the system of "divorce on demand". When both parties 
agree to divorce, there is no need to show that the divorce is 
based on any of the enumerated grounds. Only when the divorce is 
contested does it become necessary to prove one of the grounds in 
court. 
61 The CCC, Book V, Section 1514-1515, 1520 and 1522 
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In Canada, prior to 1968, the divorce law varied from 
province to province. Judicial divorce was introduced in Ontario 
in 1930 by the Divorce Act (Ontario), S.C. 1930, C.14. By 1967, 
judicial divorce could be obtained in Alberta, British Columbia, 
Manitoba, the Northwest Territories, Ontario, Saskatchewan, and 
the Yukon Territory on the following grounds. A husband could 
obtain a divorce only by proving his wife's adultery. A wife 
could petition on the grounds of adultery, rape, sodomy, 
bestiality or bigamy. Unlike the other provinces, New Brunswick, 
Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island each enacted a divorce law 
prior to Confederation. By Section 129 of the B.N.A. Act, these 
laws continued in effect until the Parliament of Canada enacted 
the Divorce Act of 1968. In all of these provinces, adultery was 
a ground for divorce. In New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, 
frigidity was also a ground. Divorce on the basis of cruelty was 
available only in Nova Scotia. 
Section 23 of the Divorce Act 1968 repealed all prior 
divorce laws. This statute provided for the first time a Canada- 
wide law of divorce. It introduced the concept of permanent 
marriage breakdown as a ground for divorce. Section 4 of the Act 
provided that where a husband and wife were living separate and 
apart, a petition could be brought on the ground that there had 
been a permanent breakdown of marriage by reason of one of the 
circumstances listed in Section 4(1). The circumstances listed 
include imprisonment, alcohol or narcotic addiction, whereabout 
of spouse unknown, nonconsummation, separation and petitioner's 
desertion. 
Thus under the 1968 Act, a divorce could be granted, based 
on either fault grounds or breakdown grounds. There was no 
general right to divorce outside the scope of the enumerated 
grounds. As far as fault grounds are concerned, the Act gave to 
a court jurisdiciton to grant a divorce based on adultery, 
cruelty, bestiality, sodomy, homosexual act or form of marriage 
43 
with another person. Such fault grounds entitled the innocent 
party to bring proceedings for divorce against a guilty party 
immediately. 
Before the enactment of the 1968 Act, there had been 
discussion as to whether divorce on the ground of matrimonial 
offence should be abandoned. The special Joint Committee of the 
Senate and House of Commons on Divorce recommended the retention 
of this ground.62 The Committee stated numerous advantages of 
the matrimonial offence idea. It was said to be a definite 
system generally understood by the public at large. Also it 
provided security for a marital relationship, especially for the 
wife past middle age who had lost her youthful charm and whose 
husband had a roving eye. The Committee concluded that it would 
be difficult to dispense with the matrimonial offence completely. 
Since most people regarded marriage as an institution which 
provided certain specific rights and duties for the spouses in 
respect of each other, a spouse should have the right to an 
immediate divorce if the other departed from the standard of 
marital fidelity. 
On the other hand, retention of the fault grounds was 
criticized as being based on the unrealistic assumption that 
causes of marriage breakdown could be specified in a limited list 
of behaviours. Beginning with accusations of misconduct, the 
original marital conflict could easily escalate into an 
unproductive round of counter-accusations and reprisals. Such a 
process would discourage any inclination either spouse might have 
to attempt reconciliation or to co-operate in resolving such 
issue as maintenance or child custody. 
62 See the Report of the Special Joint Committee, 1967, 
pp. 103-104, Reproduced in Hovius, Cases, Notes and 
Materials on Family Law. 
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Whatever the case may be, the Divorce Act 1985 repeals the 
Divorce Act 1968 in its entirety and substitutes a new code for 
divorce including jurisdiction, grounds for divorce and corollary 
relief. By Section 8 of the Act, marriage breakdown is now the 
sole ground for divorce. Breakdown of the marriage is 
established if the spouses have lived separate and apart for at 
least one year, or one spouse has committed adultery or cruelty. 
When proceeding on the basis of marriage breakdown pursuant to 
Section 8, it is no longer necessary to wait until the statutory 
separation period has accrued before commencing the divorce 
proceeding. The proceeding may be commenced immediately 
following separation as long as the divorce decree itself is not 
granted until the expiry of the one-year period. 
This new provision makes it easier to obtain a divorce. 
Formerly under the 1968 Act, a divorce based on fault grounds 
would often be granted as soon as the courts had time to deal 
with the case. But if marriage breakdown grounds were used, the 
spouses had to wait for a separation period of three years (for 
the deserted spouse) or five years (for the deserting spouse). 
Also under the 1968 Act there is no longer a requirement that a 
formal trial be held. Section 25 of the Act gives wide power to 
provincial rule-making bodies to make rules governing divorce 
practices and procedures including the manner in which the 
divorce comes before the court. Further, the rule-making bodies 
may make rules providing for the disposition of a divorce 
proceeding without an oral hearing. The intent is to permit the 
provincial rule-making bodies to limit trials to those cases 
where they are absolutely necessary and to eliminate those where 
no issues are contested. In Ontario, the procedural rules are 
contained in 0. Reg. 560/84. These rules permit "divorce by 
affidavit" without an oral hearing in uncontested cases. 
Thus there is a move by the law to relax the divorce 
procedure in Canada. It is normally done by a registrar who, 
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having examined the petition and accompanying affidavit and if he 
is satisfied, certifies that the petitioner is entitled to a 
decree and sends the case to a judge for the Decree Nisi to be 
announced in open court. This has an advantage of reducing the 
adversarial nature of divorce proceedings and saving court time 
and costs. However, it also means that divorce procedure is now 
becoming an administrative matter and there is a risk that some 
divorces may be obtained on grounds that are legally 
insufficient. 
The change in Canadian divorce law is part of the trend 
which was happening between 1969 and 1985 in nearly every Western 
country. The chief common characteristics of all these changes 
were the recognition or expansion of non fault grounds for 
divorce, and the acceptance or simplification of divorce by 
mutual consent. In 1969 California became the first Western 
jurisdiction to eliminate fault grounds for divorce. In that 
same year England passed a new divorce law which purported to 
make divorce available only when a marriage had irretrievably 
broken down. The English statute permitted marriage breakdown to 
be proved by evidence of traditional marital offences, such as 
adultery and cruelty, as well as by long separation. This 
English type of compromise statute seems to be the approach 
adopted in Canada.63 However, under the English system, mutual- 
consent divorce is available after a two-year separation and 
unilaterial non-fault divorce is permitted only after the spouses 
have lived apart for at least five years.64 Therefore, the 
Canadian divorce law which requires only one-year separation 
presents a much more radical change. 
63 See Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western 
Law, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1987, pp. 66-67 
64 The Divorce Reform Act of 1969. It is now consolidated 
in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, as amended by the Matrimonial 
and Family Proceedings Act. 1984. 
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In one respect the abandonment of fault grounds can be 
detrimental for women. Its retention could give a considerable 
bargaining advantage to a legally innocent spouse whose partner 
was impatient to get a divorce. Negotiating practices developed 
in which one spouse might exchange cooperation in obtainng a 
divorce for economic concessions from the other. In this way, 
the fault-based system could and often did operate so as to 
afford some economic protection to a dependent wife and children 
when a family broke up. To the extent that the new divorce laws 
made it possible or even easy for one spouse to obtain a divorce 
in spite of the opposition of the other, and made fault less 
relevant or even irrelevant to property and support issues, the 
dynamics of bargaining over finances were significantly altered. 
In this way, changes in the grounds of divorce may not work to 
the advantage for women. For the time being, this line of 
changes is probably not suitable for Thailand where there is 
still a lack of adequate laws governing alimony and child 
support. 
4.4 Child Custody and Access 
There is literaly no writing on the subject of child custody 
and access in Thailand. In cases of divorce by mutual consent, 
the parties must agree as to who will have custody of the 
children and as to the proportion of child support each spouse 
must contribute. If, no agreement is reached, these issues will 
be determined by the court. In cases where the divorce is 
contested and is based on a ground listed in Section 1516 as 
stated earlier, a divorce decree will be issued by the court and 
the spouse who has won the case will have custody of the children 
unless otherwise determined. No guidance is given to the courts 
in awarding custody. In the absence of research and discussion 
on the problems, I find it difficult to make any assessment of 
the law. However, there is certainly a need for Parliament to 
legislate more specifically and in more detail in this area. 
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In contrast, the issues of child custody and access in 
Canada are among the most hotly debated problems in the area of 
family law. Here custody and access orders can be made both 
under the Divorce Act, 1985 and under provincial law. In 
Ontario, custody and access applications are governed by Part III 
of the Children's Law Reform Act, 1980. Section 21 of the Act 
provides that where the parents cannot agree on custody or 
access, either can apply for a court order. Further, Section 
24(1) specifies that custody and access issues are to be 
determined on the basis of the best interests of the child. 
Under the Divorce Act, 1985, custody and access orders can 
be made in divorce proceedings or in corollary relief proceedings 
after the divorce. Section 16(1) provides that a court of 
competent jurisdiction may, on application by either or both 
spouses or by any other person, make an order respecting the 
custody of or the access to any or all children of the marriage. 
Section 16(8) stipulates that in making a custody or access 
order, "the court shall take into consideration only the best 
interest of the child of the marriage as determined by reference 
to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the 
child. Section 16(9) and (10) provides further guidance for the 
courts. 
Of particular concern to feminists is Section 16(10), the 
so-called "friendly parent" rule. This subsection provides that 
in making an order, the court shall give effect to the principle 
that a child of the marriage should have as much contact with 
each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the 
child, and, for that purpose, shall take into consideration the 
willingness of the person for whom custody is sought to 
facilitate such contact." It has been argued by the National 
Association of Women and the Law that women may be deterred from 
making complaints concerning physical, emotional or sexual abuse 
of themselves or the children. Raising such concerns in divorce 
48 
or mediation proceedings may make them seen as vindictive and 
uncooperative and thus put them at risk of losing their children 
to the abuser.65 However, no case has been cited of women losing 
custody for this reason. It appears that some lawyers do advise 
their clients not to raise such complaints lest they should have 
negative impact on the attitude of the judges. 
Another topic strongly debated in Canada at present is the 
issue of joint custody. While orders for sole custody to one 
parent and access to the other continue to be used in most cases, 
the court has authority under both the Children's Law Reform Act 
and the Divorce Act, 1985, to deviate from this model. Section 
16(4) of the Divorce Act explicitly states that the court may 
grant "custody of, or access to, any or all children of the 
marriage to any one or more person". This coupled with the 
"Friendly parent" provision in Section 16(10) make joint custody 
available as an option. 
The idea of joint custody has been received with enthusiasm 
from groups which are often termed as "fathers' rights" groups. 
Of these, the group which has been most involved in the question 
of custody is the Canadian Council for Co-parenting. They are 
proponents of laws mandating joint custody, except in cases where 
it was against the child's best interest. The council alleges 
that the courts are biased against fathers because mothers get 
custody more often. It is claimed that mothers obtain custody in 
85 to 90 per cent of all cases. This statistic is generally 
accepted even by feminists. Yet the point which women's groups 
consistently make is that few divorcing fathers seek custody and 
65 Louis Lamb, "Custody Reform", the National Association 
of Women & the Law Newsletter, Vol 7, No. 2, October 1986. 
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about three-quarters of all divorces involving children are 
uncontested.66 
No Canadian province has yet enacted legislation 
specifically making joint custody a preference in child custody 
arrangements or authorizing joint custody in the face of 
opposition by one or both parents. A private member's Bill 
advocating mandatory joint custody was proposed in February 1988 
by Dr. James Henderson, a Liberal backbencher in Ontario.67 T h e 
purpose of the Bill is to create a legal presumption that custody 
of a child should be granted jointly to both the child's parents 
when both parents are seeking custody. The presumption is 
rebutted if the court determines that joint custody is not in the 
best interests of the child. The effect of this proposed 
legislation would make Canadian law on child custody somewhat 
similar to that adopted by some 32 states in the United States 
with California being most often cited as the model. However, 
this Bill is unlikely to get very far. 
The idea of mandatory joint custody has been generally 
resisted by feminist groups in Canada. In their view, since 
joint legal custody often means that both parents continue to 
have joint legal responsiblity for the child's upbringing, it may 
impede the ability of the primary-caretaker, usually the mother 
to make needed and timely decisions. It has also been argued 
that most fathers who demand joint custody do not want to have 
actual physical control of the children but rather, they want to 
be involved in decision-making. In this sense forcing joint 
custody is seen to represent "post divorce patriarchy", a way for 
66 Rona Maynard, "Fathers' Rights", Chatelaine, November 
1988. pp 61-63._ 
67 See Bill 95, An Act to amend the Children's Law Reform 
Act, printed under authority of the Legislative Assembly by the 
Queen's Printer for Ontario. 
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men to maintain power over their ex-wives.68 There has also been 
concern that if mandatory joint custody is available in law, this 
may be used by the husband to bargain out of court for a 
reduction in child support payments and that women will give up 
some of their financial rights in order to keep their children. 
Furthermore, forcing joint custody gives an abusive husband a key 
for perpetual acces to his ex-wife and children. 
At the same time it has been urged by some writers that the 
court should order joint custody. One author has pointed out 
that there are a number of social trends indicating that more 
women are pursuing careers outside the home, while men are 
participating to a far greater extent in child rearing and 
household maintenance functions. Thus the sole custody concept 
is a product of a world that no longer exsits. He cited many 
studies which show that post-divorce mothers with sole custody 
feel overburdened by their children whereas divorcing fathers are 
not sufficiently burdened. Also it is pointed out that many 
research findings indicate that "joint custody children made a 
relatively easy adjustment to the demands of living in two 
households.69 
Whereas it is understandable why joint custody should be 
favoured in view of its advantage in allowing meaningful contact 
between the child and both parents, some studies show that it is 
not necessarily beneficial to the children. A. U.S. research by 
Dr. Judith Wallerstein from the Centre for the Family in 
Transition in California, shows that in 100 families where 
parents had been forced into joint custody, the children were 
68 See Phyllis Chester, Mothers on Trial, 1986, as 
quoted in Rosa Maynard's article. 
69 See Ryan, "Joint Custody in Canada: Time for 
a Second Look", (1986), 49 R.F.L. (2d) 119. 
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more emotionally troubled, depressed, and withdrawn than children 
under the custody of one parent.70 
As far as the law in this area is concerned, joint custody 
appears to be governed by two cases of the Ontario Court of 
Appeal which were decided early in the debate over joint custody 
and which have since been followed elsewhere in Canada. In Baker 
V. Baker7l the Court of Appeal, in overturning the trial 
judgement, decided that parents must be able and willing to co- 
operate as loving parents before joint custody can be awarded. 
It may not be accurate to say that the court did not favour joint 
custody per se. The Baker Case was not an appropriate case for 
joint custody. Neither party requested or wanted joint custody. 
Both had demonstrated an inability to coperate in matters 
concerning the child. 
In Kruger V. Kruger 72 which was decided two months later, 
the highest court of Ontario once again declined to award joint 
custody in the absence of the agreement of both parties. In this 
case, the parents had cooperated in a de facto shared parenting 
arrangement prior to trial and the father had requested an order 
for joint custody in appealing an award of sole custody to the 
mother. A majority of the court held that the fact that there 
was "agreement" between the parties on the subject of joint 
custody was a major consideration in deciding whether to order 
it. From the lack of agreement the court seemed to infer an 
unwillingess or inability of the parents to cooperate in child 
rearing. 
70 The Toronto Star, "Solving Custody Wars No Small 
Task", August 27, 1988. 
71 (1972) 23 O.R. (2d) 391 
72 (1972), 25 O.R. (2d) 673 
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For advocates of joint custody, the decisions in Baker and 
Kruger slowed the acceptance of joint custody as an option. 
However, there are some recent decisions in which the courts did 
award joint custody despite objections from one or more of the 
parents. In Darling V. ChunQ73 the Ontario Supreme Court awarded 
joint custody of three children to their parents despite the 
father's vigorous objections to the arrangment. According to the 
judge, he was compelled to grant joint custody in spite of the 
father's strong objections because it was in the best interest of 
the children. Similarly in Nurmi V. Nurmi,74 a Hamilton- 
Wentworth District Court judge decided to award joint custody of 
a five year old child to his parents over the mother's 
objections. In her opinion, the mother's desire to retain 
control of her son was "not sufficient reason to deprive her 
child of a shared parenting arrangement which would provide to 
him the maximum amount of effective parenting available from the 
two adults in his life." 
Therefore, there is some indication that judges are moving 
in the direction of joint custody. The fact that some joint 
custody orders are being made without both parents' consent has 
raised concerns among feminists. They are of the opinion that 
cooperation and compromise cannot be court ordered. 
Unfortunately, this is the area where the existing joint custody 
research assists us least. No studies have yet been completed 
that compare "court ordered" and "voluntary" joint custody 
families. Most of those joint custody families which have been 
studied chose joint custody freely and thus were highly motivated 
73 
74 
The Lawyers Weekly, Ontario. Vol. 8, No. 12, 
July 15, 1988. 
The Lawyers Weekly, Ontario, Vol. 8, No. 22, 
October 14, 1988. 
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to make it work.75 Therefore one must take care not to 
generalize about joint custody families on the basis of data 
obtained from biased samples. 
In the light of these conflicting views, it is perhaps not 
advisable for law to favour joint custody. However, joint 
custody should continue to be available as an option for parents 
who want it and for children who can handle it. An alternative 
to joint custody has been proposed by some feminists. This is 
based on exisiting West Virginia law which gives preference'to 
the "primary caretaker parent", defined as the one who, during 
marriage, does most of the childcare work, such as preparing 
meals, dressing and bathing the child and interacting with the 
child's friends and school authorities.76 Though it may be 
argued that this type of provision is gender-neutral, it can also 
easily interpreted as giving maternal preference, especially by 
fathers' rights groups. In this way, I cannot see how it could 
solve the current custody debate in Canada. 
Along with the issue of custody is the problem concerning 
access. In Thailand, there is no legislation on the question of 
access. In Canada, much of the discussion concerns enforcement 
of access orders. Under both the Children's Law Reform Act and 
the Divorce Act, 1985, the parent with access has more than 
visitation rights. He or she also has the right to make 
inquiries and to be given information regarding the health, 
75 See The Politics and Experience of Co-Parenting: 
An Exploration Study of Shared Custody in Canada CRIAW 
paper by Cerise Morris, Social Service Department, Dawson 
College. The paper in effect supports shared parenting. 
However, most of the 43 Canadian families studied had 
voluntary co-parenting arrangements. 
76 Linda Silver Dranoff, "Joint Custody, Controversial 
Cure-All", Chatelaine, May 1987. 
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education and welfare of the child.77 The denial of access is 
treated as contempt of court. The normal means of punishment are 
censure, fine or imprisonment. However, none of these would 
solve the problem. Fines would simply reduce the family income 
of the lower income family. Also courts are extremely reluctant 
to put a custodial parent in jail since this would not be in the 
best interest of the child. 
The Ontario Government has recently introduced legislation 
intended to allow more effective enforcement of access orders.78 
The proposed legislation would allow, inter alia, access parents 
to apply to the courts to have access orders or agreements varied 
to refer to specific times or days for access. An access parent 
who has been wrongfully denied access could also apply to the 
court for relief. Such reliefs include ordering compensatory 
access for a period not longer than the period of access actually 
denied, supervision of custody or access and ordering the 
custodial parent to reimburse the access parent entitled to 
access for any reasonable expenses actually incurred as a result 
of the wrongful denial of access. 
In Manitoba, a parental access assistance program has been 
developed by the Attorney General's Department and the ministry 
of community Services. This is a three-year project designed to 
help parents without custody obtain secure access to their 
children. 
These types of proposed legislation and programs have been 
supported by fathers' rights group as a step in the direction of 
making family law fairer to men who in almost 90 per cent of 
divorces do not have custody of their children. As may be 
77 Section 20(5) of the Children's Law Reform Act and 
Section 16(5) of the Divorce Act, 1985. 
78 See Children's Law Amendment Act, 1988, Bill 124 
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predicted, such development is viewed by feminists as having the 
potential for harassment of women, especially battered women. In 
their opinion, there is no evidence that access violations have 
become a national problem rivaling the problem of unpaid child 
support. Whereas the rate of default in child support used to be 
as high as 75 per cent a few years ago, the 1987 federal study of 
divorce found that custodial parents denied visiting rights just 
7 per cent of the time.79 
To a certain extent, the latest version of the proposed 
Children Law Reform Amendment Act for Ontario has addressed some 
of feminists' concern. It would allow custodial parents to deny 
access if they have reason to beieve that the visit would cause 
physical or emotional harm to the children. Drunkenness and 
history of domestic violence are relevant factors to be taken 
into consideration by the courts in determining whether a denial 
of access is wrongful.80 This version of the proposed 
legislation has drawn criticism from some fathers' rights group. 
It seems therefore that problems of custody and access in 
Canada are very complex issues with no easy legislative solution. 
For a country like Thailand which has provided practially no 
legislation on the issues, the Canadian experience is both 
interesting and valuable for its future enactment of the law in 
this area. 
4.5 Division of Matrimonial Property 
The matrimonial property regime in Thailand is the community 
of property system. This system is based on the assumption that 
the marriage is an economic partnership. The earnings and 
79 Rona Maynard, "Fathers'Rights", supra, Chatelaine, 
November 1988, p. 140 
80 See Sections 24(3), 35a(4) of the Bill 
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property acquired by the efforts of either spouse become 
community property in which each spouse has a present legal 
interest. In the event of dissolution of the marraige, the 
community property, after payment of community debts, is divided 
equally between the spouses. 
The provisions concerning matrimonial property in Thailand 
are contained in Sections 1465-1493 of the CCC, Book V, 1976. In 
principle the law recognizes two kinds of property: the separate 
property of each spouse and community property. Any property 
owned by either spouse before marriage or acquired by either 
spouse by way of gift or inheritance during the marriage is 
treated as the separate property of that spouse. This property 
is not shared on the termination of the marrriage but is owned by 
the owner-spouse. All other property, however acquired, becomes 
community property wich must be shared equally. 
Traditionally the husband had sole power in the management 
of matrimonial property and this was what the CCC, Book V of 1935 
provided. Naturally, this generated a lot of criticism from 
women. The newly revised CCC, Book V of 1976 has changed this. 
The husband and wife now have joint management powers in 
community property. Any dealing with this part of property 
cannot be done without the other spouse's consent. There are 
rules which regulate the extent to which community property is 
liable for the discharge of contractual obligations or debts 
incurred by either spouse. 
Generally, the division of matrimonial property in Thailand 
is still a complex matter left largely to lawyers. Property 
owned by either spouse is presumed in law to be community 
property unless it can be proved to be separate property. 
Therefore if the spouses do not maintain adequate records of the 
source of funds used to acquire property, problems of tracing or 
of co-mingling will inevitably ensue. However as far as the 
protection for women's rights is concerned, this part of the 
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family law does not seem to provoke criticism especially since 
the law now affords equal rights to the wife in the management of 
the common assets. Also it appears that the law recognizes the 
differing contributions of both spouses and allocates their 
property rights as the financial and economic fortunes of the 
marriage progress. Further it has psychological advantages for 
the home-making wife to feel that she has a legitimate stake in 
the marriage. Thus, despite its potential complexities, the law 
here has not prompted serious criticism from feminists. 
In Canada, property rights between husbands and wives are 
matters which come within provincial jurisdiction. Thus the law 
may vary from province to province. However, in most provinces, 
the economic and emotional contribution that women make in the 
home is now recognized. Also generally both parties are deemed 
to have an interest in important assets such as a matrimonial 
home no matter in whose name the title of the asset may be. 
In Ontario, the matrimonial property regime adopted is a 
system of separate property with deferred sharing. The law in 
this area is now governed by the Family Law Act, 1978. Under the 
previous legislation, each spouse had equal rights to all family 
assets. Since family assets did not include assets such as 
pensions, RRSPs, or stocks and bonds, which were normally owned 
by the income-earning spouse, the other spouse was often left 
with significantly fewer assets than his or her partner. This 
was particularly unfair to women who were mostly home makers. 
Another instance of unfairness was that the property division 
rules only applied to marriage ended by separation or divorce. 
It did not apply to marriage ended by death. 
The Family Law Act, 1986, makes no distinction between 
family and non-family assets. Also spouses are now entitled to 
share the value of everything acquired during the marriage 
whether it is terminated by separation, divorce or death. 
Similar to its predecesor, the Act adopted a deferred sharing 
system. The basic concept underlying this system is that all 
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property acquired by either spouse during marriage is to be 
shared equally when the marriage partnership is dissolved. Until 
this point is reached, both spouses are separate as to property. 
The owner of the property can deal with it as he or she thinks 
fit. once the marriage has broken down, an accounting takes 
place, the-assets of both spouses are ascertained and from these 
are deducted certain types of propertry exempted from division, 
such as property brought into the marriage, gifts or inheritence 
a spouse received during the marriage. The matrimonial home must 
always be brought into calculations of net family property. The 
spouse with the lower net family property value deducts it from 
the net family property value of the spouse with the higher 
figure, and is then entitled to half the difference between the 
two figures. The payment of the difference is known as the 
equalizing payment. 
Currently, it does not seem that division of matrimonial 
property receives as much interest from Canadian feminists as 
other areas of family law such as custody and access. This may 
be due to the fact that the Act has just come into force and it 
is too early to assess its impact. However there has been some 
criticism that the Act does not take into account the fact that 
spouses' actual contributions to marriages can be quite different 
along gender lines. Further, since the Act provides that the 
court may order unequal division in limited circumstances which 
make the equal division unconscionable, it is predicted that 
there will be a volume of litigation for the court to define the 
circumstances that justify an unequal divison. According to one 
writer, this trend is unlikely to benefit women.81 
4.6 Maintenance and Support 
81 Mary E. Morton, "Dividing the Wealth, Sharing the 
Poverty: A Feminist Analysis of the Role of Law in the (Re) 
Formation of the family.", The Canadian Review of Sociology 
& Anthropoloqy, Vol. 25, May, 1988. 
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By the broad term "maintenance and support" I refer to both 
spousal support and child support. In Thailand, there is very 
little legislation on these questions. As far as child support 
is concerned, the law provides simply that the divorcing spouses 
must agree as to what proportion of child support each would 
contribute. If no agreement is reached, this would be determined 
by the court.82 Thus, the law concerning child support is stated 
in a very broad and general terms leaving wide discretion to the 
parties and the court in this matter. It should be noted that 
child support is regarded as both spouses' obligation so that the 
means and capabilities of each spouse would play an important 
role in this question. There has been no research on the 
application and enforcement of the law in this area. 
With regard to the question of maintenance or spousal 
support, this is provided in Section 1526 of CCC, Book V, 1976. 
The provision is gender-neutral. Entitlement to spousal support 
is based on fault of the other spouse against whom the claim is 
brought. An action for maintenance or support must be brought 
concurrently with the divorce proceeding. Since entitlement 
depends on proof of fault on the part of a delinquent spouse, the 
action can only be brought by an innocent spouse. In awarding 
support, the court must take into account the means and 
capabilities of the payor and the payee. Apart from this, no 
other guidelines are provided to the court. Again, there has 
been no reserch on the question of spousal support and this issue 
has hardly been raised by Thai feminists. 
In Canada, a claim for spousal support was traditionally 
available to a wife. Most forms of matrimonial relief were fault 
based, depending upon the respondent being proven to have been 
82 Section 1522, CCC Book IV, 1976. 
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guilty of some matrimonial offences.83 During the last twenty 
years, there has been a shift away from these old concepts of 
fault and a dependent wife. Under the 1968 Divorce Act, fault on 
the part of the respondent was not a prerequesite to the 
obtaining of a divorce, nor to the award of support. Husbands 
were eligible for an award of maintenance as well as wives. 
Provincial legislation passed in the 70s and 80s followed this 
trend. The underlying philosophy for the new support legislation 
is that each spouse has an obligation to provide suport for him 
or herself and for the other spouse in accordance with need and 
to the extent he or she is capable. There is an obligation on 
each party to be self-supporting and support is premised on need 
rather than on fault. 
The Divorce Act, 1985, makes substantial changes to the law 
of support in divorce. Section 15(7) sets out the objectives 
that the court must follow in determining spousal support. 
Section 15(6) explicitly provides that in making support order, 
"the court shall not take into consideration any misconduct of a 
spouse in relation to the marriage". In addition, Section 
15(7)(d) states that an order made by the court should in so far 
as practicable promote the self-sufficiency of each spouse within 
a reasonable period of time. These changes reflect the high 
incidence of divorce and changes position of women both in 
society and with the family. 
The emphasis put on self-suficiency has given rise to 
concerns. It means that the court should encourage self- 
sufficiency by awarding support only until self-sufficiency is or 
should be attained. To this end there has been growing number of 
cases in which maintenance is awarded for a specific time or on a 
diminishing basis. It must be admitted that in general, women 
83 See the Deserted Wives' and Children's Maintenance 
Act, R.S.O. 1970, C. 128 and 
the Matrimonial Causes Act, R.S.O. 1970, C. 265 
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are still disadvantaged in the market place and many women still 
devote their lives to traditional role of housewife and child- 
rearer with their husband 's encouragement. After separation and 
divorce, it may not be easy for them to get out into the work 
world, especially if the divorce comes after a lengthy marriage 
and if the wife is no longer young enough to compete outside the 
home. 
The statistics revealing the economic plight of single 
parent families headed by mothers are depressing. It has been 
said that 43 per cent of female-headed single parent families 
live below proverty line, compared to only 14 per cent of male- 
headed single parent families. Only 65 per cent of custodial 
parents are awarded any child maintenance, and only 18 per cent 
of those custodial parents are awarded periodic payments for 
themselves. Thus, it has been argued that the new divorce law 
with its emphasis on a financial "clean break" ignores the 
poverty endured by women and their children.84 
One factor which has contributed to the economic plight of 
divorced mothers and their children is the high default rate in 
paying support. In Ontario, it was estimated that in the area of 
support alone, a full 85 per cent of orders were in default at 
any one time.85 As a consequence, the Ontario Government passed 
the Support and Custody Orders Enforcement Act in 1987. This Act 
establishes the office of Support and Custody Enforcement and 
provides it with powers to enforce support and custody orders. 
The main objective of this support and custody enforcement 
programs is to relieve the costs involved for individuals to 
start legal enforcemnt procedures in cases of default. By filing 
84 Louis Lamb, "Involuntary Joint Custody: What 
Mothers Will Lose if Fathers' Rights Groups Win", Horizon, 
Jan/Fev. 1987, p. 23 
85 See the brochure on Support and Custody Enforcement 
Program, Ministry of Attorney General 
62 
a support order with the Support and Custody Enforcement Program, 
the defaulters will be located and support orders will be 
enforced. If no payment is made, harsher actions such as 
garnishing of wages or seizing of defaulters' assets, may be 
taken. The program also enforces custody orders in cases where 
there is a serious failure to return a child or possible 
abduction. 
In conclusion, it is evident that Canadian law provides more 
than Thai law on the issues of maintenance and support. This may 
be due to the fact that there is a higher rate of divorce in 
Canada and thus it has become necessary to legislate more on 
consequences related to marriage breakdown. However, it is 
desirable that Thailand should develop more provisions dealing 
with custody and support especially since these issues also 
affect children directly. It is unfortunate that the legislature 
has given little consideration to these problems. 
4.7 Mediation 
Mediation in marital disputes has never been discussed or 
introduced in Thailand. While mediation is being used in Canada, 
it is not considered as an alternative to litigation, generally 
termed as the adversarial system. Mediation involves the use of 
an independent third party who seeks to bring the parties to an 
agreement. It has been argued that this process is preferable to 
the adverserial system where the parties are involved in bitter 
court fights. 
The advantages of mediation have been said to be as follows. 
First, this process would enable the parties to agree on a 
solution rather than having one imposed upon them by the court. 
There is a higher chance that resolution achieved through 
mediation will last longer than one achieved after a bitter court 
battle. Also litigating a family law matter is expensive, time- 
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consuming, and divisive. At the end of the process, the 
relationship between the litigants is even more severely damaged. 
All suffer through the process, especially the children.86 
However, mediation has also many disadvantages. By and 
large it is still an unregulated business so that anyone can 
become a mediator. One must admit that it requires some 
sophisticated skills to mediate family law disputes so that 
mediation conducted by someone without proper training can be 
unfair. Of particular concern to women is the fact that 
mediation assumes that both parties are equal in their bargaining 
powers. Since women are usually the less powerful party, 
mediation may fail to provide full protection and thus force the 
weaker party to accept a resolution which gives her far less than 
she would be entitled to in a financial adjudication. Further, 
lower child support may be agreed to because of the very strong 
pressure women feel in family disputes to give up monetary 
benefits to be assured of custody. 
The 1985 Divorce Act, Section 9(2) imposes an obligation on 
a lawyer acting for a spouse to discuss the advisability of 
negotiating custody and support matters and to inform the spouses 
of mediation facilities that might assist the spouses in settling 
those matters. A lawyer must certify on any court document that 
he or she has complied with the section. Therefore it seems that 
the law recognizes that mediation can be an effective supplement 
in the judicial process. It would be more desirable, however, if 
the law should also regulate on the qualifications of mediators. 
86 Sachs, "The Dejudicialization of Family Law: 
Mediation and Assessment." Sloss ed. Family Law 
in Canada: New Directions, Canadian Advisory 
Council on the Status of Women, Ottawa, 1985, 
Reproduced in Hovius' Cases & Materials in Family Law. 
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Currently, the fathers' rights group which openly supports 
mediation as a model for settling custody disputes is the Council 
for Co-Parenting. While Canadian feminists have not developed a 
position of objecting to mediation per se, they do object to 
introducing mandatory mediation in family law disputes. 
Mandatory mediation has already been adopted by some American 
states such as California. In any case, it has been urged, 
mediation should be excluded from all disputes involving domestic 
violence. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper represents my effort to conduct a comprehensive 
survey of Thai and Canadian law and women particularly in the 
areas of criminal law and family law. Due to lack of time I 
cannot discuss all the topics in as much depth as I have wished 
to. The overall impression from this study is that Canadian 
women have achieved much more than Thai women in securing not 
only equality before the law but also equal benefits of the law. 
In some areas such as sexual assault offences, the state of the 
law in Canada represents the proposed law reforms Thai feminists 
are asking for. However, in some other areas such as 
prostitution and abortion, the problems are similarly unresolved 
in both countries. 
As far as family law is concerned, there is much more 
legislation in Canada than in Thailand. Some issues, such as 
maintenance and support, custody and access, are hardly touched 
upon by Thai family law. This is probably due to the fact that 
divorce is a more common phenomenon in Canadian society and 
therefore there is a need to legislate in more details in this 
area. Canadian feminists also play a much more active role in 
family law debate than Thai feminists. 
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Perhaps the unique feature of Canadian law as related to 
women is the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Canada has reached 
the stage where discrimination on the face of particular 
legislation is no longer an issue. The "equal benefit" clause in 
Section 15 enables women to tackle systemic discrimination in a 
way which cannot be done in many countries. It is believed that 
the charter will continue to play an important role in the area 
of women's rights for many years to come. 
